



Report from

HEPiX Fall '03

&

LISA '03

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DESY Zeuthen,
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LISA



- Large **I**nstallation **S**ystems **A**dministration conference
- organized by Usenix every late autumn someplace in US
- Format:
 - 3 days of **tutorials**
 - 3 days of **parallel sessions**
 - and **BOFs** in the evenings
- DESY participants (~ 1500 total)
 - **W. Friebel, P. v.d. Reest, Stephan Wiesand**
 - have printed **proceedings** & CD with most tutorial materials
- online proceedings available to Usenix members

HEPiX



- politically correct name: **HEPiX/HEPNT**
 - meeting held twice a year, in spring and fall
 - on either side of atlantic ocean every other time
- **Fall '03** held at **TRIUMF** in **Vancouver**
 - DESY participants (73 total)
 - **R. Baltrusch, P. v. d. Reest**
 - **W. Friebel, H. Schwendicke, Stephan Wiesand**
 - **<http://www.triumf.ca/hepix2003/>**
 - all **presentations** (powerpoint or staroffice or PDF format)
 - **audio/video capture** of almost all sessions (actually very usable)
 - **good summary** (23 pages of text in PDF format)

HEPiX Fall '03: Format



- 3 days of **site reports** and **general talks** (many very good)
- 1 day dedicated to presentations on **security** (ditto)
- $\frac{1}{2}$ day of parallel sessions
 - **security round table**
 - **windows round table**
 - about security, first part joint security session
 - **mass storage forum** (not covered in this talk, P.v.d.R. only)
- first HEPiX with commercial **vendor demos**
 - demos and talks by 2 vendors of **advanced, global file systems**
- **invited talks** by Red Hat & Microsoft



Talk Format

- Part I

- by S.W.
 - Windows input from H. Schwendicke, R. Baltrusch
- ~ 30 minutes
- mostly along HEPiX lines
- focus:
 - selected site report topics
 - security
 - linux distribution discussion
- additional input from LISA

- Part II

- by W.F.
- ~ 15 minutes
- focus:
 - spam fighting
 - monitoring
 - other omissions by S.W.

Topics from HEPiX Site Reports



- Operating Systems
 - Linux, Windows, Solaris/SPARC everywhere
 - some HP-UX, AIX, IRIX left, typically being phased out
 - little MacOS (X) support, typically not on agenda
 - Windows rules the desktop domain
 - Linux rules the compute server domain
 - Linux is conquering the "real services" domain at many sites
 - AFS, NFS, Oracle, TSM, ...
 - mail, DHCP, Web, DNS, ...
 - all sites **concerned** about **linux distributions**
 - some expressed interest in Solaris/x86
 - SUN was marketing it very actively at LISA

Site Report Topics: Hardware



- **Complaints** about P4/**Xeon**
 - **performance/GHz** much worse than PIII
 - HyperThreading helps, but issues with linux scheduler, and CPU accounting / job scheduling complicated
 - **power consumption**
 - "Westgrid" at UBC (1008 dual Xeon 3GHz) can not run all blades (IBM bladecenters) in a crate until power supplies replaced
- positive reports about AMD **Opteron** performance
 - being **considered for most farm purchases** next year
- one site reports **SCSI-attached IDE-RAID** was a **desaster**
- CERN seems last site settling for "**white boxes**"

Site Report Topics: Windows



- all sites have or are deploying **AD domains**
 - 2000, 2003, XP
 - NT/9x still exist at some sites
- most sites have deployed or are evaluating at least one of
 - **MS SMS**
 - **systems management server**
 - **MS SUS**
 - **software update service**
 - necessity for efficient **patch deployment**
 - **typically, only for new domains**
 - NT/9x often managed manually only

Site report Topics continued



- Windows Terminal Services
 - either already deployed
 - sites report use increasing
 - often citrix
 - or being evaluated (most other sites)
 - typically RDP
- SLAC project on AD/Heimdal password synchronization
 - working with MS on tools to allow this smoothly
 - interest expressed by DESY Windows group
- Kerberos 5 is present or most likely future at all (?) sites
 - desire for single sign on expressed by some



Security

- most major labs had a high ranking security officer present
- security officers at all sites had an "interesting" year
 - Windows worms & viruses
 - Slammer, Sobig, Lovsan, Welch,...
 - temporarily caused up to 30% packet loss on internet
 - effectively shut down some labs (and enterprises)
 - infected systems within minutes
 - during (re-)installation
 - before systems could be patched when turned on
 - CERN hit by virus before antivirus signature available
 - exploits IE weakness, installs spam relay on random high port
 - lab faced threat of being brought to court due to nature of spam



Security continued

- Linux **ptrace** vulnerability
 - trivially exploited from cracked user accounts
 - success rate almost 100%, exploit widely available
- frightening **root kits**, like SuckIt
 - very good at concealing itself, very hard to detect
 - installs backdoor defeating all firewalling
 - listens on ALL ports for backdoor trigger packets
 - then initiates TCP connection from infected host
- **users** running
 - P2P filesharing software
 - IRC (and being caught by bots)
 - vulnerable sshd or httpd or... (on high ports)

Security: Common Problems



- common agreement today these are the worst problems:
 - systems **not** properly (professionally) **managed**
 - each of these measures alone almost eliminates attack potential:
 - applying **patches** timely
 - running **antivirus** software with daily updated signatures
 - running a **personal firewall** at least buys time
 - how could so many systems be compromised this year ?
 - **fix for many attacks available weeks / months / years before !**
 - **firewall penetration**
 - **notebooks, VPN, dialup (home systems)**
 - **unauthorized, vulnerable services / applications**
 - users downloading **malware**, opening unknown attachments, ...
 - notebooks that can only be updated inside their home network
 - one week can be too long these days



Security: Common Measures

- most sites now apply these or are planning to do so:
 - all **devices** attached to network **must be registered**
 - and **responsible has to agree (in writing) to rules**, like
 - system must be configured securely
 - patches must be applied timely, system rebooted if necessary
 - system must be running update antivirus and firewall
 - system must not be running unauthorized services
 - **users** of centrally managed systems **must agree to rules**, like
 - no P2P software or other unauthorized services / applications
 - **VPN/dialup users must agree to rules**, like
 - no additional software, no usage by the kids, ...

Security Measures: Exceptions



- exceptions from rules generally granted if necessary
 - if work cannot be done without violating them
- most sites require a written statement
 - why there's a need for it
 - what technical measures prevent security breaches
 - "how will you prevent unauthorized file access through your P2P filesharing application?"
 - signed by user and responsible
- sites report almost all requests are withdrawn after pointing out this requirement



Security Measures: Scans

- major sites run scans of their network
 - detect vulnerable systems, unauthorized services
 - detect compromised systems (backdoors, ...)
 - full scans regularly
 - typically take $O(1 \text{ month})$ to complete
 - individual scans immediately when new devices attached
 - problems:
 - scan may disrupt operation of some devices (DAQ equipment...)
 - -> first detect OS, then apply specific scan
 - feasible to quarantine new systems until scanned ?
 - vulnerable/compromised systems disabled on network level

Security Round Table Results



- HEPiX labs will agree on **common set of minimal rules** for systems to be attached to their networks
 - systems carried by guests from other HEP labs are expected to comply with these
- incidents and attacks should be communicated to the (closed) security mailing list
- a **new security discussion list** for HEPiX was created
 - not public, but **open** to anyone from any HEP lab
 - subscription must be approved by list owners (hosted at fermilab)
 - **new members expected to introduce** themselves
 - or may be removed from list



Security: Summary

- today's threats are serious
 - no major damage yet, but only matter of time
- "patch early, patch often!"
 - any system, centrally managed or not
 - including network gear, farms, desktops, notebooks, ...
 - this is a significant deviation from
 - "choose patch time wisely for optimal availability"
 - "it's ok to patch servers only"
 - "locally only exploitable bugs aren't worth patching"
- firewalls can help, but are **not** a sufficient solution
 - limit exceptions as much as possible

The Linux Discussion: Background



- almost all HEP sites run some vanilla **Red Hat Linux**
 - many also already run a few Red Hat Enterprise Servers
 - typically for Oracle
 - significant cost per server and year
- some (DESY, GSI) run SuSE and/or debian
 - few SuSE/debian hosts at few other sites
- Red Hat early this year shortened **distribution life times**
 - to 12 months
- later this year they **discontinued** their vanilla distribution
 - superseded by **Fedora**, life time 6-9 months

Linux Discussion: Background



- distribution end of life:
 - RedHat 7.x 12/03
 - RedHat 8.0 12/03
 - RedHat 9 04/04
 - Fedora Core 1 07/04 (at best, and limited)
 - SuSE 8.2 04/05
 - SuSE 9.0 10/05
 - debian woody 12/04 + ? (12 months after undefined date)
- SuSE/Red Hat Enterprise distributions live 5 years
 - = unlimited in practice

HEPiX Linux Discussion



- most labs now have to find a new workhorse distro soon
 - CERN & probably others will support 7.3 until 12/04
 - but need several months for certification of new OS
- most labs have contacted distributors about volume licensing
 - we talked to SuSE and RedHat, all others to Red Hat only
 - all got similar offers around XXX \$/year/node
 - no lab could negotiate acceptable conditions so far
- => try common HEP effort
 - Red Hat invited to HEPiX
 - session on this topic (w/o RedHat presence, w/o recording)

Red Hat at HEPiX



- Red Hat sent Don Langley
 - sales manager for california
 - including SLAC
- held a **plain marketing** talk for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3
 - session not recorded
 - pdf on the web
 - no additional information
- **refused to discuss** HEP volume licensing
 - just stated they're **"interested in creating a win-win situation"**

Summary of Discussion Session



- most sites really want to use Red Hat Enterprise Linux
 - debian/SuSE/others not considered seriously
- but **not** with their default support model
 - HEP sites most of all want the patches
 - not per incident remedial services
 - after inserting an own kernel module, these are void anyway
 - on LISA, heard complaints about service from people having it
 - some sites interested in RHN satellites (->delegation)
- HEPiX believes Red Hat have not yet made up their mind
 - give them more time (how much ?)
- try negotiating on higher level

Other Linux Options discussed



- some consider **rebuilding** a RHEL from **sanitized source**
 - after all, it's *GPL*
 - **probably legal** if all trademarks and files with other licenses are removed, and the name is changed
 - situation is **not really understood** by anyone
 - CERN would require written permission before redistribution
- some consider using **Fedora**
 - and hoping for **Fedora Legacy** to work
 - volunteer project hosted by Red Hat to provide patches for old fedora
- **hardware vendors** may offer reasonable RH WS licenses
 - but what to do with existing hardware?



Linux in HEP: Next Steps

- CERN, SLAC, Fermilab will try to negotiate with Red Hat
 - objective: acceptable conditions for using RHEL
 - in all HEP (LCG?) labs, and collaborating institutes
 - no deadline set
- U.S. department of energy is negotiating for all their labs
 - what if they succeed, and HEP doesn't ?
- DESY will watch from the side line
 - we're about to roll out DL5 based on SuSE 8.2
 - buys us a year, no immediate pressure
 - but we expressed interest to buy into a reasonable solution



Email (HEPiX)

- at HEPiX two reports on [Spam fighting](#) (GSI and CERN)
- GSI:
 - did setup a new mail infrastructure based on [postfix](#)
 - input and output filters for mail with [amavisd-new](#)
 - SPAM tagging with [spamassassin](#) (2.55)
 - Virus filtering with [clamav](#) and [sophie](#)
- CERN:
 - converted the central mail servers to [Exchange](#)
 - was previously sendmail + UW-IMAP
 - spam fighting with [homegrown script](#) (.net framework based on SA)
 - proposal to use feedback mechanism for new mail senders

SPAM fighting at CERN



- Proposal to **approve mails for new sender addresses**
 - user receives mail from a new address
 - automatic response generated to **prove identity** of sender
 - only if sender replies, the sender gets **whitelisted**
- Much critics at HEPiX
 - similar **amount of work** to be done as for unfiltered mail
 - **impractical** for e.g. mailing lists
 - **easy to forge** by hackers
- Even more critics for similar concepts at LISA
 - 2-3 in favor, approx 500 against it.

SPAM mini symposium at LISA



- Very broad attendance, general **trends** were visible
 - most of the sites use or plan to use **spamassassin**
 - some other proposed methods very unpopular (see prev. slide)
- **legal issues** discussed
 - fairly easy to track spammers
 - spammers usually engaged by others to do the dirty work
 - would need to **punish the profit making site**
 - **could be abused** by competitors to spam in their name

SPAM and Viruses



- Active State and SOPHOS well known in this market
 - Active State acquired by SOPHOS recently
 - come now with Spam + Virus handling
 - additionally management interface for policies etc.
- SOPHOS talked about **new ideas** in SPAM fighting
 - **observe new tricks** of spammers and have **countermeasures**
 - e.g. white ink (print e.g. blue on blue) became almost white ink (print blue on slightly different color of blue)
 - now testing for difference in color space



HEPiX Login scripts

- Reworked by CERN
 - used also at DESY (with mods)
 - maintained **compatibility** with original concept
 - **no longer dependency on external software**
 - remarkable **speedup** achieved
- Reintegration at DESY?



Monitoring

- talk at HEPiX in the context of **fabric management**
 - work based on software written for **Grid work package 4**
 - also covered **configuration management**
 - in use at CERN already, **not ready for outside labs yet**
- **Network telescope** (invited talk at LISA)
 - great idea to observe network attacks
 - <http://www.caida.org/analysis/security/telescope/>



Monitoring

- Many talks and tutorials at LISA
 - **alarming** tools (e.g. nagios, scout (DESY))
 - **intrusion detection** tools (e.g. snort)
 - **monitoring (system and network)** (e.g. MRTG)
- Many tools for monitoring based on RRDtool
 - most major sites do have monitoring/alarming/IDS in place
 - at DESY (Zeuthen) alarming well covered, monitoring at the network level only, IDS not yet
- Work underway to do more monitoring



Famous last Words

- HEPiX/HEPNT and LISA are quite different
- both are very relevant to DESY computing
 - even if focus of this presentation was on HEPiX
- DESY staff should attend both regularly
 - next LISA: Nov. 14-19, 2004 in Atlanta
 - next HEPiX/HEPNT: May 2004 in Edinburgh